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  The potential environmental impacts of commodity support programs —
commodity programs, crop insurance, and disaster payments— continue to receive 
attention from a wide variety of groups, including Federal and local government, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the popular press. One facet of this issue is the 
growing concern about the effect of farm programs on agricultural land use.  
Environmentalists, wildlife groups, and some livestock interests are particularly 
concerned about the conversion of native grasslands to crop production (GAO).  Annual 
rates of grassland conversion of 2 percent have been measured in some areas of the 
Northern Plains (Stephens, et al.).  Native grasslands are important habitat for a number 
of threatened or at-risk species and, once lost, cannot be easily re-established. 
  Farm program payments are often cited as a contributing factor in the conversion 
of grassland for crop production (Morgan).  Commodity programs, crop insurance, and 
disaster payments compensate farmers when prices and/or yields are low.  Over time 
these payments increase the average return to, and reduce the risk of, crop production.  
While a significant share of commodity payments are decoupled from production—
producers cannot increase payments by producing more—some Federal farm program 
benefits continue to depend on production.  Converting grassland to cropland will not 
change direct or counter-cyclical payments, which depend on only past production 
measured in specific base periods.  Marketing loan benefits, crop insurance indemnities, 
and some disaster payment, however, do depend on current production and, with some 
limits, can increase when “new land” is added to a farm through conversion of grassland   3 
to cropland.  Of course, policies that increase commodity demand and commodity 
prices—such as renewable fuels mandates (e.g., ethanol or bio-diesel)—can also 
encourage producers to shift land into crop production.  
  Because of high prices, driven in part by bio-fuel mandates, Marketing Loan 
Benefits are not really an issue at this time.  MLBs effectively set a fixed floor under the 
price farmers receive for program commodities (e.g., corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton).  
Because these payments are based on overall production, program crops grown on new 
land would be eligible to receive them.  However, payments are made only when price 
drops below a pre-determined loan rate.  Because current and projected prices are high 
relative to commodity loan rates, the prospect of a marketing loan benefit in the 
foreseeable future is remote for most program crops.  Current corn ($3.90 on April 10, 
2009) and wheat ($6.44) are well above respective loan rates ($1.95 and $2.75). 
  Past research on the land use effect of farm programs has focused largely on crop 
insurance (e.g., Goodwin et al; Wu; Lubowski et al.).  Depending on the study, 
subsidized crop insurance may have increased land in crop production by 1-3 million 
acres nationally.  Each of these studies, however, use data from the 1990s or earlier 
periods, predating the large increase in crop insurance premium subsidies enacted in the 
Agricultural Risk Protections Act of 2000.  Higher subsidies increased crop insurance 
participation (Dismukes and Vandeveer).  By 2002, 80 percent of eligible acreage was 
covered and most producers (insured at 65 or 70 percent coverage) paid less than half of 
the full premium. 
  The Risk Management Agency, which sets the terms under which Federal crop 
insurance is provided, limits crop insurance coverage on new land by requiring at least   4 
one year of production history (i.e., crop insurance is not generally available in the first 
year of production on new land) and otherwise limiting a producer’s crop insurance 
“yield” or APH on land in the first several years of production.  Limiting the APH 
reduces both the likelihood that crop insurance indemnities will be received and the size 
of indemnities that are received.  We refer to these rules as the RMA “new land” 
provisions.   
  Concern about the effect of crop insurance on grasslands in the Prairie Pothole 
Region (PPR)—an area of the Northern Plains that encompasses parts of five states—
prompted Congress to legislate an additional limitation on the availability of crop 
insurance on new land.  Enacted as part of the 2008 farm act, the “Sodsaver” provision 
could deny crop insurance on new land for a period of five years.  Implementation, 
however, is at the discretion of PPR Governors—who must take action before Sodsaver 
will apply to producers in their state.  
  Further complicating the picture is a new disaster program—also part of the 2008 
farm act—which effectively serves as a free supplement to crop insurance.  Supplemental 
Revenue Assistance (SURE) is a whole farm program that provides supplemental 
payments to farmers who purchase Federal crop insurance
1 and are located in a “disaster 
county” (a county declared by the Secretary of Agriculture to have suffered weather-
related production losses of 50 percent or more) or a contiguous county.  For insurable 
crops—which are predominant in the PPR—SURE payments can be made only to 
producer’s who have purchased crop insurance with the level of payment increasing with 
the level of insurance coverage (expressed as a percent of expected yield or revenue).  
                                                 
1 Producers of non-insurable crops can also be eligible for SURE.  We ignore these crops because most 
land in the PPR is planted to insurable crops.   5 
Being a free supplement to crop insurance, SURE could increase the potential impact of 
crop insurance on land use decisions, particularly in regions where high yield variability 
could result in frequent disaster declarations.  
  We will estimate the effect of crop insurance and SURE payments on expected 
returns to crop production (corn and wheat) and the variability of those returns for seven 
representative farms in the PPR.  Each of these farms represents a North Dakota or South 
Dakota county where grassland to cropland conversion was particularly high in 2005-06 
according to data collected by the Farm Service Agency (Table 1).  For each of these 
representative farms, we consider three scenarios.  As a benchmark, we estimate the 
effect of crop insurance indemnities and SURE payment crop revenue when the purchase 
of crop insurance on new land is not restricted in any way (i.e., assuming the RMA new 
land provisions and Sodsaver provision are not in force).  Second, we consider the status 
quo—crop insurance indemnities and SURE payments on new land with the current 
RMA “new land” provisions in place.  Finally, we consider the effect of the Sodsaver 
provision on crop insurance and SURE payments.   
  Evidence on the relative contributions of  crop insurance and the new disaster 
(SURE) payments to overall crop revenue could shed light on the role of farm programs 
in land conversions.  Our hypothesis is that the more these payments increase mean 
returns and decrease the variance of returns to crop production, the larger their potential 
role in the conversion of grassland cropland.   
 
 
   6 
Farm Programs, New Land, and Crop Revenue in the PPR 
  To analyze the role of crop insurance and SURE in overall crop revenues we 
develop a joint distribution of crop yields and crop prices for our seven counties.  Using 
these distributions, we estimate expected crop revenue, the variability of crop revenue, 
and the effect of crop insurance and SURE for each of our three scenarios.  In the next 
section, we describe our derivation of yield and price distributions.  In this section, we 
discuss (1) calculation of crop insurance indemnities, (2) the effect of RMA new land 
provisions and the sodsaver provision on those indemnities, (3) calculation of SURE 
payments, and (4) crop revenues under each of our three scenarios.   
  Crop Insurance. Crop insurance is widely purchased in the Prairie Pothole 
Region (PPR).  The most popular product in the PPR is Revenue Assurance (RA) with 70 
percent coverage, accounting for 32 percent of insured corn acreage and 29 percent of 
insured wheat acreage (RMA).  Overall, RA accounts for 74 percent of insured corn 
acreage (70 and 75 percent are the most popular coverage levels) and 44 percent of 
insured wheat acreage, almost all of it insured at 65, 70, or 75 percent coverage.     
  Under the base price option, an RA indemnity is paid when realized revenue 
(realized price times actual yield) falls below the guarantee, which equals the RA base 
price multiplied by the producer’s APH yield and the coverage level. The per-acre 
indemnity is:      
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Whereθ  is the coverage level,
b
i p is the RA base price for crop i,  i y is the producer’s 
actual production history (APH) yield, i p is the realized price, and i y is the actual yield.   7 
  Crop insurance premiums are heavily subsidized.  At 70 percent coverage, 59 
percent of the full premium is paid by the government.  If premiums are actuarially fair, 
the net return to producers, over time, would equal 59 percent of indemnities.
2  Over a 
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      RMA new land provisions.  Production history is critical to crop insurance 
premium rating for both yield and revenue products.  “New land” is problematic because 
it has no production history.  In general, the purchase of crop insurance requires at least 
one year’s cropping history,
3 while premium rating requires a minimum of four yields.  
On land with less than four years of cropping history, transitional or “T” yield can be 
used to fill the history.  For land with one year of actual history, the other three yields are 
equal to 80 percent of the county transitional or “T” yields for the three years prior to 
land conversion.  If land is cropped for the first time in year t, and the producer purchases 




                                                 
2 A number of authors have argued that premium rates are not actuarially fair and that some producers 
benefit from asymmetric information while others are charged higher than fair premiums (see Just et al. 
(1999) and Makki and Somwaru (2001)).  RMA data shows that crop insurance losses are persistent in the 
Northern Plains (Glauber), suggesting that our estimates of the crop insurance subsidy may be, on average, 
conservative.  
3 Insurance could be provided by written agreement although RMA is not obligated to provide coverage 






t y 1 − is the “T” yield for time t-1, and so on.  Similar rules govern the calculation of 
T yields for producers who defer crop insurance purchase until the third or fourth year of 
production.  For simplicity, we assume producers will purchase crop insurance as soon as 
possible (without a written agreement). 
  Sodsaver.  If implemented, Sodsaver would deny crop insurance coverage on new 
land that was converted from native sod, for a period of five years.  The five year hiatus 
would give producers time to develop a sufficient cropping history to avoid RMA’s new 
land provisions once crop insurance becomes available on the additional land.  At this 
time, however, none of the PPR Governors has chosen to implemented sodsaver.   
  SURE payments.   Because SURE payments are contingent on the purchase of 
crop insurance (when available) the RMA new land and Sodsaver provisions also affect 
SURE payments.  The SURE payment guarantee, when these payments are triggered, 
depends on the level of crop insurance coverage selected by producers.  The level of the 
SURE payments, once a disaster has been declared, depends on overall (farm-level) crop 
revenue, crop insurance indemnities, and commodity program payments.  (We do not 
consider prevented planting, ad hoc disaster aid, or non-insured crops.)  The SURE 
payment, D, is equal to: 
10 1 . 0
10 4
4 / ) 80 . 0 (
4 / ) ) ( 80 . 0 (





2 1 1 3
1 2 1 2
3 2 1 1
> =
≤ ≤ =
+ + + =
+ + + =










+ + − +
+ − − +
− − − +
s y y
s y s y
y y y y y
y y y y y





















t t  9 
  ) 0 ), ( 60 . 0 max(
T R G D − =  
Where G is the SURE guarantee and
T R is total farm revenue.  The guarantee for insured 
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where  i a  is planted acreage of crop i (or acreage where planting was prevented) and
C
i y  
is the producer’s counter-cyclical payment program yield.  Note that the guarantee is 
based on the crop insurance guarantee,  i
b
i i y p a θ , with depends on the coverage level 
selected by the producer and the APH yield.    
  Total farm revenue includes market revenue, commodity program payments, and 
crop insurance indemnities: 
  ( ) ∑ + + + − + =
i
i i i i
b
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T CCP DP MLB y p y p I y p a R 15 . 0 ) (θ    
where i MLB  is the per-acre marketing loan benefit, DP is the producer’s total (farm-
level) direct payment, CCP is the total counter-cyclical payment, and MLB is the total 
marketing loan benefit.  Finally, payments can be made only to producers who are 
located in counties where a disaster has been declared, counties contiguous to disaster 
counties, or to producers located anywhere who have experienced production 50 percent 
or more below normal levels.   
  The SURE payment on new land will be equal to the change in the guarantee less 
the change in total farm revenue.  The per-acre change in the guarantee will be: 
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depending on whether the revenue guarantee formula yields a number that is above or 
below 90 percent of expected revenue.  The APH yield would be subject to the RMA new 
land provisions.  The per-acre change in total farm revenue would be: 
   ( ) ∑ + − + =
i
i i i i
b
i i i
T MLB y p y p I y p R ) (θ . 
In years without crop insurance coverage (under either RMA’s new land provisions or 
Sodsaver) the SURE payment on new land would be zero.  
   Putting it all together: Crop revenue under three scenarios.  Because RMA’s 
new land and Sodsaver provisions would play out over a number of years, we consider 
the potential effect of these alternative policies over 10 years.  Using crop yield and price 
distributions developed in the next section, we calculate the net present value of overall 
revenue and the standard deviation of NPV for each of three scenarios.  In the first 
scenario, we assume that crop insurance and SURE payments can be received without 
restriction.  In this scenario, county average expected yields are used as the APH yield for 
the representative farm in each county.   
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Second, we consider crop revenue with the RMA new land provisions in force, but in the 
absence of sodsaver.  The producer’s revenue on each acre of new land during the first 
ten years of production includes market returns and the possibility of crop insurance 
indemnities and SURE payments after the initial year (year 0): 
  ( ) ∑∑ ∑∑
= =





) ( ) (
t i




it it it t
NL D y p y p I s a y p a R θ θ δ δ .   11 
where the APH yield evolves as described above. Finally, with Sodsaver in place, 
revenue on new land revenue over a 10 year period would include only market revenue 
for the first five years, and   
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We estimate the distribution of R (mean and standard deviation) using price and yield 
distributions, as described in the next section.  For the sake of comparison, we also 
estimate the mean and standard deviation of the net present value of market revenue.
4   
 
Modeling Yield and Price Distributions 
  We model the joint distribution of yields and prices for corn and spring wheat 
then use the joint distribution to estimate the distribution of crop revenue under the three 
different policy regimes outlined above.  Yield-price relationships are determined at the 
national level as fluctuations in overall production affects in commodity markets.  
Variations in national crop yields, however, may or may not be correlated with local yield 
variations.  Dry weather is the Corn Belt, for example, will have a larger impact on 
national average corn yields than dry weather occurring in another part of the country 
where comparatively little corn is produced.  So, county and national yield may be well 
correlated in the Corn Belt but show little if any correlation in regions where less corn is 
grown.          
  The realized national average yield for crop i (corn or spring wheat) at time t, it y  , 
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4 In a future version of this work we plan to adopt an alternative to NPV which is more appropriate when 
considering uncertain returns over time.    12 
generate a yield distribution for crop i at time s using historic yield shocks, historic yields 
must be detrended to reflect technical change between time t and s, i.e., Yit is detrended 
as: 
(2)  ( )( ) 1 + ∆ = it is
d
it Y Y E Y ,∀i counties, t periods,  s t ≠ . 
Expected yields, ) ( it Y E , are estimated by regressing average yields on a linear trend using 
data for 1975-2008.  It is convenient to specify the yield deviate as the deviation of 
detrended yield from expected yield in the base year, which we denote as 
d
it Y ∆ .   
  Realized harvest prices, it P , are also transformed into deviation form:  it P ∆  =  




P E P −  where  ) ( it P E is pre-season expect price.  For each crop, we follow 
RMA definitions of the expected and realized prices.  For the realized price of corn, for 
example, we use the average of the daily October prices of the December CBOT corn 
future in period t.  For the expected price, E(Pt), we use the average of the daily February 
prices of the December Chicago Board of Trade corn future.  For continuously cropped 
wheat, the realized price is obtained by averaging the closing prices in August for the 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGE) September wheat futures contract.  The expected 
(base) price for wheat is calculated as the simple average of the closing daily prices in 
February for the MGE September futures contract. We calculated these prices using daily 
futures market data for 1975 to 2007.   
  The relationship between it P ∆  and
d
it Y ∆ is econometrically estimated. We assume 
that it P ∆  can only be partially explained by
d
it Y ∆ , and that the uncertainty in this 
relationship can be incorporated into the empirical distribution.  We do so by specifying 
it P ∆  as    13 
(3)  it P ∆  =  ( ) it it
d
it z Y g ε + ∆ ,    
where it z is a vector of other variables that may explain the price deviation and it ε  is the 






∆ < 0, i.e., the greater the realization of national 
average yield over the expected level, the more likely harvest time price will be lower 
than expected price.   
  We jointly estimate the distributions of  it P ˆ ∆  and 
d
it Y ∆  by repeated estimation of 
Equation (3) using a bootstrap procedure.  Specifically, a pairs bootstrap approach is used 
in a joint resampling methodology that involves drawing i.i.d. observations with 
replacement from the original data set (e.g., Yatchew).  The bootstrap data-generating 
mechanism is to create replications by treating the existing data set of size T as a 
population from which samples of size T are extracted. Variation in estimates results 
from the fact that upon selection, each data point is replaced within the population.   
  Crop insurance indemnities, SURE payments, and marketing loan benefits depend 
on farm level yields, which we represent using county-level yields with standard 
deviations inflated to reflect farm-level conditions, as previous researchers have done 
(e.g., Schnitkey et al.).  We detrend county level yield data, reported by NASS, for non-
irrigated corn and non-irrigated, continuously cropped spring wheat:   
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where C indexes the county.  Once detrended, these county-level yields are also 
expressed as deviations from the trend:
Cd
it Y ∆ .  Using methods similar to those of Coble et 
al. (2007), we inflate the standard deviation of county yield to approximate that of a 
“representative” farm.  We choose a constant, α, such that standard deviation of    14 
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equals the standard deviation implied by crop insurance premiums where  ) (
F
i Y E  = 
) (
C
i Y E .  Using ) (
F
i Y E  we estimate the non-subsidized APH premium for 65 percent 
coverage using the RMA on-line premium calculator 
(http://www.rma.usda.gov/tools/premcalc.html) and the premium subsidy rate for 65 
percent coverage. We use a search procedure to identify the value of  C α  that makes the 
expected indemnity for yield-based insurance equal to the RMA premium.  For each 
value of  C α  a bootstrap procedure is used to generate a distribution of yields and the 
expected indemnity.  
  County-level yield distributions must be generated in a way that maintains 
underlying correlations across crop yields within counties and with national average 
yields and market prices.  To do so, we generate the county yield distributions in a 
nonparametric fashion by appealing to a spatial version of the block-bootstrap (e.g., 
Lahiri), as applied to the county yield histories over t = 1,…,T.  When crop yields (e.g., 
corn and spring wheat yields) within a county are correlated, using a standard bootstrap 
and drawing each
Fd
it Y ∆  randomly and with replacement from each yield history will 
generate incorrect estimates of payments because a standard bootstrap assumes that the 
between-crop correlation of yields equals 0.  In the block-bootstrap approach, we make 
random draws of the entire yield vector, thereby maintaining the spatial relationship 
between the yields.  We replicate the historic correlation of price and yield deviates by 
maintaining the year-to-year relationships when conducting the bootstrap procedures for   15 
generating it P ˆ ∆ ,
d
it Y ∆ , 
Cd
it Y ∆ , and
Fd
it Y ∆ , i=1…I which are then used to calculate simulated 
yields and prices.    
   
Simulation Results 
  Figure 1 shows the 10-year net present value (NPV) of expected net crop 
insurance indemnities (indemnities less the producer premium) and expected SURE 
payments when crop insurance purchase is not restricted.  The SURE payment is 
relatively modest—net crop insurance indemnities make up a large majority of expected 
payments from these two programs—more than 80 percent in most counties—although 
their relative size varies from 78 percent in Beadle County to 89 percent in Stutsman 
County.  As shown above, the SURE guarantee is (at most) 20 percent larger than the 
crop insurance guarantee, but only for the purpose of triggering a payment. The actual 
SURE payment is (at most) 60 percent of the additional guarantee, leading an effective 
increase in the guarantee of (at most) of about 12 percent.  Moreover, SURE payments 
are made only in years when disasters occur, further reducing their overall size, over 
time.  The fact that SURE payments are not made on a crop specific basis, as are crop 
insurance indemnities, tends to reduce the SURE payment relative to overall crop 
insurance indemnities.  
  Figure 2 shows the combined NPV of net crop insurance and SURE payments, 
over a ten year period, for three our scenarios: (1) no restriction on the purchase of crop 
insurance, (2) crop insurance “new land” provisions in force, and (3) sodsaver in force.  
Figure 3 shows the same values as a percentage of market revenue.  When crop insurance 
can be purchased without restriction, the expected net present value of crop insurance   16 
exceeds $100 per acre in each of our 7 counties, and ranges from just over $100 per acre 
(Stutsman County) to more than $200 per acre (Beadle County).  Net crop insurance 
indemnities and SURE payment range from 4.4 percent to almost 8.3 percent of market 
revenue (Figure 3) and will obviously be a much larger share of expected net return to 
crop production.   
  Under the RMA new land provisions, net indemnities are reduced to 70-80 
percent of their unrestricted value in each county.  Loss of the crop insurance indemnity 
in the first year automatically reduces expected net indemnities to no more than 87 
percent of their unrestricted NPV.  Because we expected the full value of crop insurance 
in years 4 through 9, discounted at 7 percent, the lower bound on expected return under 
the new land provision is about 50 percent.  Our estimates fall toward the high end of the 
range, despite reduced APH yields in the first three years of crop insurance purchase.  
Because T-yields are relatively high (roughly equal to county average yields in many 
counties) and farm-level crop yields are highly volatile (Table 2), new land provisions 
have a relatively modest impact on indemnities and SURE payments.  For both corn and 
wheat, standard deviations, adjusted for farm level conditions, are roughly 50 percent of 
average yields in most of the seven counties included in our analysis.
5    
  Because Sodsaver denies crop insurance coverage for a full five years and, by 
extension, would also deny SURE payments over the same period, it would have a large 
effect on crop insurance indemnities and SURE payments compared to the RMA new 
land provisions.  Assuming a 7 percent discount rate, the net present value of expected 
net indemnities and SURE payments would be limited to just over 40 percent of their 
                                                 
5 Only minor adjustments were made to county level standard deviations for wheat.  For wheat, adjustment 
factors ranged from 1.06 to 1.6.  For corn, adjustments were larger, ranged from 2.73 to 3.24.  Nonetheless, 
the relationship between mean and standard is quite similar for corn and wheat.    17 
unrestricted 10-year NPV.  Land that had been farmed for five years prior to crop 
insurance purchase would have sufficient production history to make the new land 
provisions moot. 
  The effect of crop insurance and SURE payments on the standard deviation of 
revenue (i.e., the variability of the 10-year NPV) reflects previous results in the sense that 
crop insurance would have a larger effect on overall variation.  When crop insurance 
purchase is not restricted, net crop insurance indemnities and SURE payments would 
reduce standard deviations by 19 to 24 percent, with 1.5 to 3.5 percent attributable to 
SURE payments, depending on the county.  Figure 4 shows the standard deviations, as a 
percentage of expected market revenue, for market returns and for market returns with 
crop insurance and SURE payments for our three policy scenarios. Mirroring previous 
results, the new land provision has a smaller effect on standard deviation than does the 
sodsaver provision.  This outcome is not surprising given the relative size of the expected 
payments. 
  Results so far are for average land in each county.  It is reasonable to expect, 
however, that new breakings are more likely to occur on lower productivity land.  To 
investigate this possibility, we reduced the average yield in each county by 10 percent 
then re-estimated the models.  While mean yields dropped by 10 percent, standard 
deviations also went down (as the standard deviation inflation factors were re-estimated), 
but only slightly—no more than 5 percent in any case.  So, the lower expected yield may 
result in larger expected crop insurance indemnities.  
  With lower yields, the NPV of expected market returns dropped by about 10 
percent in each county, as would be expected.  Net crop insurance indemnities and SURE   18 
payments, however, do not necessarily decline.  Figure 5 shows the absolute change in 
per acre returns to crop insurance and SURE, for our no limit, new land, and sodsaver 
scenarios between the average land and lower productivity cases.  In each case, the 
change is positive for the new land provision and larger than the no-limit or sodsaver 
change when these changes are also positive.  Because transitional yields are fixed at the 
county level (the same for all producers with a county, regardless of site-specific yield 
potential), the effect of the new land provision on crop insurance indemnities is declines 
as the expected yield declines.     
  Figure 6 shows the difference in crop insurance and SURE returns, as a 
percentage of market revenue for the no-limit, new land, and sodsaver scenarios.  
Because market revenue declines by 10 percent for the lower quality land, the relative 
change is positive for each county and scenario combination.  Nonetheless, relative 
changes are modest, less than one percent of market revenue in all cases.        
 
Conclusion 
  Our results show that SURE payments would supplement crop insurance 
indemnities, increasing expected returns and reducing the variability of returns over time.  
These changes could make a difference in land use decisions, although we cannot 
quantify that difference at this time.  However, SURE payments are modest relative to net 
crop insurance indemnities because SURE payments are realized only in years when 
disasters are declared and depend on whole-farm loss rather than crop-specific losses.    
  Our results also show that RMA’s new land provisions can reduce the effect of 
crop insurance and SURE on expected revenue and the variability of revenue, but the   19 
effectiveness of these provisions depend on the relationship between county T yields and 
the productivity of the land being converted.  The lower the average expected yield on the 
new land, the less effective the new land provisions will be, given that T yields are fixed 
at the county level.  The Y-yield effect, however, appears to be small especially in 
relation to expected revenue. 
  Sodsaver would be significantly more effective than the RMA new land 
provisions in reducing the effect of net crop insurance indemnities and SURE payments 
on expected revenue and the variability of those revenues.  While we cannot quantify the 
land use effect of crop insurance and SURE, the sodsaver provisions would almost surely 
be more effective at reducing these effects when compared to the new land provisions.    20 
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Table 1.  New Breakings, 2005-06, for Selected Counties in North and South Dakota 










North Dakota            
  Stutsman  NA  1,971  1,971  9.57 
South Dakota         
  Beadle  2,055  2,101  4,156  4.05 
  Edmuns  3,845  4,361  8,207  8.00 
  Faulk  2,831  2,170  5,001  4.88 
  Hand  5,040  2,748  7,788  7.59 
  Hyde  2,835  1,501  4,336  4.23 
  Sully  1,867  3,943  5,810  5.66 
           
  North Dakota Total (2006)    20,592  9.57 
   South Dakota Total (2005 and 2006)  102,571  34.41 
Source:  Farm Service Agency         23 
 
Table 2.  Average Yields, T Yields, and Standard Deviation of Yields     



















North Dakota                  
  Stutsman  98  81  50  35  34  18 
South Dakota             
  Beadle  93  94  50  33  38  19 
  Edmuns  103  99  52  40  39  21 
  Faulk  104  100  57  42  41  23 
  Hand  81  80  52  36  34  23 
  Hyde  72  68  50  33  32  25 
   Sully  71  71  41  33  31  23 
Sources:  ERS analysis of NASS data, Risk Management Agency 
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Figure 3. NPV of Expected Net Return to Crop Insurance and SURE Payments, as a Percentage 
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Figure 6. Change in NPV of Expected Return to Crop Insurance and SURE as a Percentage of 












Stutsman Beadle Edmuns Faulk Hand Hyde Sully
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
No Limit
New Land
Sodsaver
 
 
 
 
 
 